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People who appear to believe in the hot hand expect winning streaks to continue 
whereas those suffering from the gamblers’ fallacy unreasonably expect losing 
streaks to reverse. 565,915 sports bets made by 776 online gamblers in 2010 were 
used for analysis. People who won were more likely to win again whereas those who 
lost were more likely to lose again. However, selection of safer odds after winning 
and riskier ones after losing indicates that online sports gamblers expected their luck 
to reverse: they suffered from the gamblers’ fallacy. By following in the gamblers’ 
fallacy, they created their own hot hands. Some gamblers consistently outperformed 
their peers.  They also consistently made higher profits or lower losses. They show 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Gambling, being a game of money, gives us a peep into the psychology of 
value. Gambling has a long history. It typically involves winning or losing money 
with uncertainties. It is one of the earliest behaviours studied in scientific research 
into probability (Bernoulli, 1738/1954).  
1.1 Classical economic theory about values.  
Economics is a science about values (e.g. money, probability). One common 
value is money. In microeconomics, the value of money is ultimately defined by 
utilities. Utility is subjective. This means that microeconomics is usually implicitly 
based on psychology. Classical economics assumes people want to maximize their 
utility and their own utility only, and that they know how to maximize this utility 
with minimum cost. Through self-interest, people can trade with each other to 
maximize their own utility. Their preferences are stable: in other words, they have a 
stable utility function. Their behaviours are consistent with their utility functions. A 
large group of people or one person over time, given enough resources to gather 
information, should demonstrate, or at least approach, rational decision making. 
People are assumed to prefer more money than less money. Money has 
diminishing marginal return of utility: all else being equal, every additional unit of 
money brings less pleasure. This view is partially derived from the law of 
diminishing marginal returns (Smith, 1776). For example, when a person is thirsty, 
drinking the first cup of water quenches the thirst most; drinking the second cup of 
water may still be nice but may not be as wonderful; a third cup may be OK; 
drinking a fourth or fifth cup will eventually bring misery. Many other products may 
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not have such a steep decrease of marginal utility but the pleasure of owning one 
more unit of the same product almost always decreases after more units have been 
acquired. Money provides the payment method for products and has a similar 
diminishing marginal utility.  
1.2 Behavioural economic theory about values.  
When an economic decision involves uncertainty, the option with the highest 
expected value has been assumed to be the preferred choice. If the same decision is 
repeated many times, the mean value will approach the expected value. However, 
questions have been raised by economists about the validity of using expected value 
as the only indicator of preferred choice. In many situations, people consistently 
prefer a lower expected value. For example, in insurance, the very fact that the 
organizers make profit from the business is a sign that the expected value of the 
potential loss is lower than the insurance premium; and in lotteries, the expected 
value of the jackpot is almost always lower than the lottery ticket. So why do the 
buyers accept a loss? This is likely to be because they have a risk preference that is 
different from what is assumed by expected value maximization. Specifically, some 
people may prefer to lose a small amount of money for sure rather than a large 
amount with small probability. A person who prefers a sure option over a risky 
option that has an equal or greater expected value is, for that particular choice at least, 
risk averse. Conversely, a person who prefers a risky option over a sure option that 
has an equal or greater expected value is risk seeking.  
Prospect theory says people value same amount of loss more than same 
amount of gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). What's more, people tend to have 
different risk preferences for different probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; 
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Tversky and Fox, 1995) and for different amounts of money (Markowitz, 1952; 
Levey, 1994). Generally speaking, when the decision is about receiving money, 
people are risk seeking when probabilities of the largest possible outcome are low 
but risk averse when they are high. Thus, Tversky and Fox (1992) re-analysed 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) data to show that the certainty equivalent of 5% 
chance of receiving $100 was a gain of $14 (risk seeking) but that the certainty 
equivalent of a 95% chance of receiving $100 was a gain of $78 (risk aversion). This 
pattern was reversed when the decision was about losing money: the certainty 
equivalent of a 5% chance of losing $100 was a loss of $8 (risk aversion) whereas 
the certainty equivalent of a 95% chance of losing $100 was a loss of $84 (risk 
seeking). This fourfold pattern of risk taking is overlaid by effects of the amount of 
money to be gained or lost. Thus the risk aversion with gains increases with the size 
of the stake (Binswanger, 1981; Levy, 1994).    
When people make a decision that involves both a gain and a loss, they tend 
to display loss aversion. For example, people who are offered a bet, which has 50% 
chance of winning £10 and 50% chance of losing £10, will often refuse it 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This implies that they anticipate that their pain from 
losing £10 will be greater than the pleasure from winning £10. Hence, for people to 
take the risk of losing £10, their potential gain needs to be bigger than that amount. 
In this chapter, I will discuss the economic psychology of gambling in terms of these 
three concepts: risk aversion, risk seeking, and loss aversion. 
1.3 Gamblers' theories about uncertainty: the hot hand and gamblers' fallacies. 
To gamblers, uncertainty is intertwined with luck. When luck is with you, 
you can win in spite of low chance of winning; when luck is not with you, you could 
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fail even with a good chance of winning. The hot-hand fallacy and gamblers’ fallacy 
are assumed to be common among gamblers because it is thought that they have a 
strong tendency to believe that outcomes for future bets are predictable from those of 
previous ones. In  chapter 4, a mechanism of the gamblers' fallacy creating the hot-
hand effect will be revealed.   
Belief in a hot-hand is “If you have been winning, you are more likely to win 
again.” The term “hot hand” was initially used in basketball to describe a basketball 
player who had been very successful in scoring over a short period. It was believed 
that such a player had a “hot hand” and that other players should pass the ball to him 
to score more. This term is now used more generally to describe someone who is 
winning persistently and can be regarded as “in luck”. In gambling scenarios, a 
player with a genuine hot hand should keep betting and bet more.  
There have been extensive discussions about the existence of the hot hand 
effect. Some researchers have failed to find any evidence of such an effect (Gilovich, 
Vallone and Tversky, 1985; Wardrop, 1999; Koehler and Conley, 2003; Larkey, 
Smith & Kadane, 1989).  
Others claim there is evidence of the hot hand effect in games that require 
considerable physical skill, such as golf, darts, and basketball (Gilden and Wilson, 
1995; Arkes, 2011; Yaari and Eisenmann, 2011).  
People gambling on sports outcomes may continue to do so after winning 
because they believe they have a hot hand. Such a belief may be a fallacy. It is, 
however, possible that their belief is reasonable. For example, on some occasions, 
they may realize that their betting strategy is producing profits and that it would be 
sensible to continue with it. Alternatively, a hot hand could arise from some change 
in their betting strategy. For example, after winning, they may modify their bets in 
13 
 
some way to increase their chances of winning again. 
The gamblers’ fallacy is “If you have been losing, you are more likely to win 
in future.” People gambling on sports outcomes may continue to do so after losing 
because they believe in the gamblers’ fallacy. This is the erroneous belief that 
deviations from initial expectations are corrected even when outcomes are produced 
by independent random processes. Thus, people’s initial expectations that, in the 
long run, tosses of a fair coin will result in a 50:50 chance of heads and tails are 
associated with a belief that deviations from that ratio will be corrected. Hence, if 
five tosses of a fair coin have produced a sequence of five heads, the chance of tails 
on the next toss will be judged to be larger than 50%. This is because the coin “ought 
to” have a 50:50 chance of heads and tails in the long run and, as a result, more tails 
are “needed” to correct the deviation from that ratio produced by the first five tosses.  
There is a conflict between belief in a hot hand and the gambler’s fallacy. 
Betting strategies are often based on the previous betting results (Oskarsson, Van 
Boven, McClelland, and Reid, 2009). The strategies based on a belief in a hot hand 
and gamblers’ fallacy may conflict. For example, when trying to decide what odds to 
select in the next round, a belief in the gamblers’ fallacy would result in betting on 
higher odds and with more money after losing than after winning. A believer in the 
hot hand would do the opposite. In this way, the hot hand and the gamblers' fallacy 
give contradictory predictions. They cannot both be true. It is worth investigating 
which strategy the gamblers use.   
There are many biases, fallacies, and even real skills in gambling, which will 





Chapter 2. Gambling games and biases, fallacies, and real skills 
In what follows, I discuss the six popular forms of gambling listed in Table 1 
and indicate how they illustrate the way that people reason about money and 
probability. After that, I discuss the economic, psychological and neurological roots 

















Table 1. Common forms of gambling 
Game Characteristics  
Prevalence as a percentage 
of all UK adults  (Wardle, 
Moody, Spence, Orford, 
Volberg, Jotangia, 2011) 
Biases, fallacies, and 
other reasons to gamble 
Lottery  
Low frequency,  
fixed odds,  
pure chance. 
National lottery 59%; 
Other lotteries 25%. 
 
Overestimation of low 
odds; The availability 
heuristic; Entrapment; 
The endowment effect; 
The representativeness 
heuristic;  
Illusions of control;  
The gamblers' fallacy;  
The hot hand effect; 
Superstitious 
behaviour; 
The near miss effect;  
Mental accounting;  
Loss chasing;  
High testosterone 
levels; Abnormal levels 
of neurotransmitters;  
Abnormal brain 
activity;  




High frequency,  




High frequency,  
fixed odds,  
pure chance. 
In a casino 5%;  





High frequency,  





High frequency,  
flexible odds,  
may involve real 
skills. 
Horse racing 16%; 
Football 4%;  
Dog racing 4%;  
Other sports events 9%. 
Card 
games 
High frequency,  
flexible odds,  
may involve real 
skills. 
Poker (pub or club) 2%; 
Casino card games 5%; 
Online games that include 







A lottery is a common form of gambling. There are at least 180 lotteries 
worldwide and the total size of lottery industry is estimated to be $284 billion 
according to La Fleur's 2015 World Lottery Almanac (Markel, La Fleur and La Fleur, 
2015). In the UK, 59% of adults purchased National Lottery tickets in 2009 (Wardle 
et al, 2011).  Typically, a lottery gambler chooses a series of numbers and pays a 
small fixed price for the lottery ticket. The winning numbers are announced 
periodically, usually a couple of times a week. The chance of winning the jackpot is 
typically extremely low.  
As an example, consider Lotto, one of the games offered by the UK National 
Lottery. With a £2 lottery ticket, the buyer chooses six numbers from a range 
between one and 59 or, alternatively, they take the Lucky Dip option and a machine 
picks the six numbers for them. There are two draws every week, one on Wednesday 
and one on Saturday. To win the jackpot, all six numbers on the lottery ticket must 
match the six winning numbers.  
There are 45,057,474 combinations of six winning numbers. In 2015, the 
jackpot size fluctuated from £886,754 to £43 million (Camelot, 2015).  
Apart from the jackpot, there are smaller prizes for people with tickets that 
have fewer than six numbers that match those selected. For those with five matching 
numbers, the prize is estimated to be £1000. However, if the number that fails to 
match one of the six that are selected does match the number on the bonus ball, then 
winnings can rise to around £50,000. There is also £100 for those with four matching 
numbers, £25 for those with tickets with three, and a free Lotto ticket for those with 
two. There is also a complimentary Millionaire Raffle included with each £2 ticket. 
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A particular combination of colour and an eight-digit number wins a £1 million 
prize; there are also twenty £20,000 prizes in every draw.  
Every time a person buys a £2 lottery ticket, they are expected to lose half of 
the money. The chance of winning any prize is 1 out of 9.3. Clearly, buying a lottery 
ticket is not an efficient way to make money. Other lotteries in the world are also 
fairly similar to the lottery games organised the UK National Lottery and have 
similar returns. For example, the expected return from participating in Powerball in 
the USA is about $0.90 for a $2 ticket and 1 in 24.87 buyers win a prize. It is clear 
from these odds that buying lottery tickets does not earn money. So why do people 
do it?  
Lottery buyers may miscalculate and believe they can make money. 
According to prospect theory, people tend to overestimate low odds of winning 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Because the extremely low odds of winning the 
jackpot are far lower than what people experience in everyday life, they may not be 
able to estimate just how tiny they actually are. 
Our understanding of the environment comes from experience. According to 
Decision by sampling theory (Stewart, Chater and Brown, 2006), each of our 
experiences is saved as a sample in memory. It is extremely rare to encounter an 
event with a miniscule chance of occurring. Therefore it is unlikely that the chance 
of such an event is represented in memory. As a result, it is really difficult to imagine 
a chance of this sort. Consequently, people are likely to use a small chance that they 
have retained in memory as a substitute for a minuscule chance that they have never 
encountered before. The small chance they think of could be a lot bigger than the 
miniscule chance.  
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Another way that people may overestimate the chance of winning a lottery is 
by using the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). In other words, 
they may estimate the probability of winning by recalling how many lottery winners 
they have heard of. For example, their attention may have been drawn to news 
coverage of a number of highly impressive jackpot wins and, as a result, they over-
estimate their chances of winning (Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010). The 
bigger the jackpot, the more jackpot winners are reported and the more people buy 
lottery tickets (Cook and Clotfelter, 1991; Matheson and Grote, 2004). When an 
event is sufficiently important (for example, involving a life changing amount of 
money), people may neglect the actual probability and decide that the event’s 
occurrence is all or none (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch, 2001; 
Rottenstreich and Hsee, 2001).  
People may play a lottery together with friends as a social activity. They may 
also buy lottery ticket to experience excitement. In other words, they buy a short 
"dream" of winning the jackpot and may be "entrapped" by the thought that, if they 
stop buying tickets, they will miss the jackpot (Beckert and Lutter, 2013; Binde, 
2013; Forrest, Simmons and Chesters, 2002). These motivations all focus on what 
winning lottery would be like rather than on the expected value of buying a ticket. 
After people have concluded that the lottery is a good way of making money, 
they invent methods to increase their chances of winning. The randomness of the 
lottery is closely monitored by its organisers, the regulation bodies, lottery machine 
engineers, independent researchers, and millions of buyers (Camelot, 2016a; 
Gambling Commission, 2012; Konstantinou, Liagkou, Spirakis, Stamatiou and Yung, 
2005). However, this does not stop people trying to increase their chances of 
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winning. Searching online using keywords such as "predict lottery" and "lottery tips" 
produces numerous suggestions for doing so.  
These tips for increasing the chances of winning can often be traced back to 
well-known cognitive biases. For example, people using the representativeness 
heuristic are likely to expect that the winning numbers should look random. As a 
result, they avoid numbers that do not look random enough, such as those with 
regular intervals or those that do not distribute sparsely across the whole range of 
possible numbers (Holtgraves and Skeel, 1992; Hardoon, Barboushkin, Derevensky 
and Gupta, 2001). Also, given their susceptibility to the illusion of control (Langer, 
1975; Rudski, 2004), people overestimate their ability of choosing winning numbers. 
This is likely to be why they prefer numbers that they have chosen themselves (Wohl 
and Enzle, 2002). In addition, there is evidence that people are affected by the 
gamblers' fallacy. If certain numbers have recently appeared among the winning 
ones, people tend not to bet on them whereas, if particular numbers have not 
appeared for a long time, they are more likely to bet on them (Clotfelter and Cook, 
1991; Terrell, 1994). People may also be affected by a belief that certain numbers are 
lucky. As a result, they make efforts to find out which those lucky numbers are by 
visiting temples, observing candle tears, examining incense ashes, and so on 
(Ariyabuddhiphongs and Chanchalermporn, 2007). People also display the 
endowment effect: they value things they own more than the same things if they do 
not own (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991). Cognitive biases of the sort 
outlined above have also been exploited within the commercial advertising to sell 
lottery tickets (McMullan and Miller, 2009). I have recently come across a hand-
written lottery advertisement on the Chinese website, weibo.com. It says "You 
already have 10 million Yuan in your bank account. You have only forgotten the 
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password. It costs 2 Yuan to try out a password. Once you have got the right 
password, the money is yours. No rush, don't give up. Your heart is here, your dream 
is here. Chinese Lottery." This is a good example of the endowment effect.  
These sorts of effects may have consequences beyond financial loss. People 
who believe that there are ways of winning the lottery and who act in ways 
consistent with those beliefs exhibit the sort of flawed judgement and decision 
making that can make them prone to problem gambling.  
Does winning the jackpot make people happy? From the huge smiles of the 
lottery winners, it is obvious that jackpots bring instant ecstasy. Surprisingly, 
however, Brickman, Coates and Janoff-Bulman (1978) found that winning a jackpot 
does not produce longer term happiness. They attributed this to the stresses 
associated with the large changes in life style and the increased responsibilities 
arising from such a win. Consistent with this, winning a relatively small amount, e.g. 
£5000, which is insufficient to lead to a change in life style or to increase financial 
responsibilities does make people happier (Gardner and Oswald, 2007).  
2.2 Scratch cards 
Twenty-four percent of all the adults in UK played scratch cards in 2010 
(Wardle et al, 2011). A scratch card is typically a paper card coated with a layer of 
black silver ink. The ink can be scratched off to reveal winning numbers or symbols 
underneath. The UK National Lottery sells them for prices ranging between £1 and 
£10. There can be more than one game on one card. Each game has its own rules. 
For example, one scratch card sold for £10 is called £4 Million Blue. It is a blue card 
claiming to have four top prizes of £4 million each. It contains a number of games. 
The first one requires a purchaser to find the UK National Lottery logo to win. 
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Suppose that, after the ink has been scratched off, a bank symbol showing £4 million, 
a vault symbol showing £5000, a suitcase symbol showing £50, and a cash symbol 
showing £10,000 are revealed. In this case, the purchaser does not win. If the Lotto 
symbol appears, the purchaser wins 4 million. Other games are similar, though some 
top prizes are smaller than £4 million.  
The odds of winning after purchasing a scratch card range from a 1 in 
4,347,890 chance of winning £4 million to a 1 in 6 chance of winning £10 (Camelot, 
2016b). The expected return at the start of the game is £7. As the cost of the card is 
£10, the buyer is expected to lose £3 for every purchase.  
The main difference between scratch cards and the lottery is that results from 
scratch cards are instant. In fact, one of the scratch cards sold by the UK National 
Lottery is called Instant Lotto. Because the result of the gamble is revealed within 
seconds after buying the scratch card, people can quickly buy another one if they so 
wish. This makes it easier for people to become addicted to purchasing scratch cards: 
if they win, they may feel lucky and buy another scratch card; if they lose, they may 
display the gamblers' fallacy and decide to have another try (Griffiths, 2000). 
Another difference is that, after the initial print run of the scratch cards, the winning 
chance changes after winning cards have been claimed.  
People display "near miss" effects with scratch cards, which we will discuss 
in detail in section 2.4 in the context of fruit machines.  
2.3 Roulette 
In 2010, 9% of the adult population in UK played casino games, including 
roulette, whereas 13% gambled online, again including roulette (Wardle et al, 2011). 
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Roulette requires no skill. It is a game of pure chance. The odds are completely clear 
and transparent. The rules are simple. There are 37 slots on the European roulette 
wheel (38 on the American one). Numbers range from 0 to 36 (with an extra 00 slot 
on the American roulette wheel). Half are red, half are black, and 0 and 00 are green. 
Gamblers can choose to bet on a single slot or a selection of slots. For example, they 
could select even or odd, red or black, the first 12 numbers, the second 12 numbers, 
the third 12 numbers, and so on. The pay-out for a single number is 35 to 1, the pay-
out for even or odd and for red or black is 1 to1, and the pay-out for any selection of 
12 numbers is 2 to 1. It is easy to see that the odds against winning for a single 
number are 36 to 1 (37 to 1 on the American roulette). The return is the profit a 
gambler can expect based on the pay-out. The expected return divides the expected 
profit by the investment (Flood, 2017). In the case of roulette, the expected return is 
the expected pay-out divided by the wager. The expected return in European roulette 
is -1/37 for a single number. For other choices, when the pay-out decreases, the 
chances of winning increases correspondingly and so the expected return is the same. 
For American roulette, similar principles hold but the expected return is -2/38.  
The result of the roulette game is available immediately and gamblers can 
play again immediately. Because of this, roulette is a good game to discuss loss 
chasing. Loss chasing is characteristic of problem gamblers according to Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2014). To normal people, if something brings pleasure, they 
do more of it; if something brings pain, they do less of it. Losing money is certainly 
painful, or least unpleasant. However, it is quite common for gamblers to gamble 
more after losing. They chase their loss in an attempt to get their money back. 
Gamblers may have a mental account for each session of gambling (Shefrin and 
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Statman, 1985; Thaler and Johnson, 1990). When they are still gambling, the book is 
not yet closed. They have not "lost". When gamblers are losing, they would face a 
sure loss if they stopped. However, if they continued to gamble, then their final loss 
would not yet be confirmed. In other words, they would be facing an uncertain loss 
with some possibility of winning back their money.  
According to prospect theory, people tend to be risk seeking when choosing 
between a large uncertain loss and a smaller sure loss (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). For example, the vast majority of people prefer an 80% chance of losing 4000 
Israeli Shekels to a sure loss of 3000 Shekels (the median family net income). 
Furthermore, once they have lost, they somehow believe that their luck will turn; 
they cannot always lose; god must be fair.  This is the gamblers' fallacy (Croson and 
Sundali, 2005). It leads to loss chasing. In order to catch the anticipated forthcoming 
good luck, they must continue gambling. It is possible that, by chasing loss, 
gamblers make themselves even more likely to lose. Because they think good luck is 
about to arrive after a losing streak, they bet on longer odds to win more money back 
and to make most out of the forthcoming good luck. However, longer odds, by their 
very nature, mean a higher likelihood of loss. So, unfortunately, gamblers bring back 
luck upon themselves by believing that good luck is on its way.  
There is even a betting strategy based on the gamblers' fallacy. It's called the 
martingale (Snell, 1982; Wagenaar, 1988). It claims to guarantee winning in a 
gambling session. The original model of the martingale strategy is based on coin flip 
but it "works" in roulette as well. Here is an example of what it involves. Your first 
stake is £1 on red. If you win, you stop. If you lose £1, you double your next stake to 
£2. If you win, you stop. If you lose again, you double your third stake again to £4. If 
you win, you stop. If you lose again, you double the stake again to £8. And so on. 
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Now suppose that you have lost three times but, finally, won. You will get £8 - £4- 
£2 - £1 = £1, if you bet on the 1:1 pay-out choice. (In fact, the expected value on a 
£1 stake is 36/37 or 36/38). You could win more if you bet on other higher pay-out 
slots. This sounds like a brilliant strategy because, no matter how many times you 
lose, you can always win in the end.  
Unfortunately, there is a catch: it is quite possible that a gambler will run out 
of funds after a losing streak. The roulette ball does not remember its history. Thus, 
that gambler is no more likely to win after losing streak than in any other round. Of 
course, for gamblers who have an infinite amount of money, the martingale is a 
reasonable strategy. Most of them, however, do not have an infinite amount of 
money to continue the game. In a limited number of rounds, the return could deviate 
far away from the expected value. With erroneous beliefs, people can be trapped in 
loss chasing and become problem gamblers. Though it is difficult to ascertain how 
many people use the martingale strategy, there are written records of it covering 
hundreds of years at least (Scarne, 1961). One vivid story is by Casanova 
(1822/2013): "Playing the martingale, continually doubling my stake, I won every 
day during the rest of the carnival. I was fortunate enough never to lose the sixth 
card … I still played the martingale, but with such bad luck that I was soon left 
without a sequin".  
2.4 Fruit machines  
In 2010, 18% of all adults in UK played fruit machines in 2010 (Wardle et al, 
2011). Fruit machines are said to be most addictive form of gambling because of 
their highly stimulating sounds and colours. According to Turner and Horbay (2004), 
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it takes just over a year to become addicted to them, whereas it takes over three years 
with traditional table games, such as roulette.  
Fruit machines, like scratch cards, represent a form of gambling that has no 
specific odds of winning. They look like vending machines and work like them. 
Typically, they have three to five reels on which pictures are depicted. The player 
inserts a coin and then pulls down a handle or presses a button. The reels spin. When 
they stop, the combination of pictures forms a certain pattern. If the combination 
comprises three pictures that are the same (or some other designated pattern), a 
reward is given. The most common winning combination is 777. The odds of 
winning on fruit machines are unknown. The fact that it is a game of pure chance 
and that the owners of the machines make money indicates that luck is unlikely on 
the gamblers' side.  
One of the main phenomena identified in studies of fruit machine gambling is 
the effect of a near miss. This is a losing pattern that is very similar to a winning one. 
For example, the three reels may stop at 776, a combination very similar to the 
winning 777. In fact, this sort of result should really be labelled a near win. 
Occurrence of a near miss makes the gamblers feel that luck is with them and that 
success is on its way. As a result, near miss experiences tend to encourage more 
gambling (Reid, 1986; Griffiths, 1991).  
In natural environments to which we are adapted by evolution, a near miss 
may indeed be close to win. For example, almost catching prey clearly indicates that 
prey is nearby and your skill levels are probably adequate to make a kill. In these 
circumstances, it makes sense to continue to hunt. However, in artificial 
environments, this link may no longer hold. A 776 in fruit machine does not indicate 
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that the result of the next spin is likely to be 777. A piece of valid natural reasoning 
has been hijacked. In fact, with functional magnetic resonance imaging, it has been 
found that the part of brain that responds to real winning also responds to near miss 
(Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones and Gray, 2009). This supports the notion that a near 
miss is a loss that is either mistaken for gain or that is taken to indicate an 
expectation that persistence will produce a gain. Any confusion between losses and 
gains could lead to problem gambling. This is because near misses that are registered 
in the brain as gains will result in gamblers receiving positive reinforcement even 
when they are losing money. As a result, they would encourage people to gamble 
more.  
2.5 Sports betting 
In 2010, 16% of adults in the UK gambled on horse races, 4% on football 
matches, 4% on dog races, and 9% played on other types of sports betting (Wardle et 
al, 2011).  
In sports betting, people bet money on the outcome of sports events. Here we 
include non-human sports events, such as horse racing and dog racing, as well as 
human sports events like football, tennis, and so on. This is because the format of the 
gambling is similar and gambling houses include betting on non-human sports as 
sports betting. Gamblers can bet against the bookmaker or against each other in a 
betting exchange. Traditionally, the bookmaker sets the odds, the gamblers bet that a 
certain event will occur (back) and the bookmaker bets that it will not (lay). This 




Betting exchange typically takes place on bookmakers’ websites. Gamblers 
bet against each other. They can offer to "back" a certain event, or to "lay" a certain 
event. Their counterparts can see the offers and choose the best odds. Bookmakers in 
this scenario work as risk-free exchange houses and do not get involved in the price 
setting of the odds. They display matches and settle the odds for a small percentage 
of commission. In both betting against the bookmaker and in betting exchange, many 
different bets can often be made on one event. For example, for a single football 
match, there can be bets on the total score, the first half score, the second half score, 
the first team or player to score a goal, the number of goals over or under a certain 
number, and so on. The range of odds can be wide. For example, they can range 
from 4:3 for "both teams to score" to 150:1 for "over 9.5 goals". Hence, gamblers 
can choose from many different types of bet and can select from a wide range of 
different risk levels.  
Gamblers who back a certain event can choose to hedge their position by 
laying that event in the exchange. This could reduce or eliminate the risk they are 
exposed to. For example, a gambler who has placed £10 on odds of 150:1 for "over 
9.5 goals" may find that the prevailing odds for the same event become 50:1 after 
four goals in the first half. He may decide to lay 50:1 "over 9.5 goals" for £20 
backer's stake. In other words, he now believes the final result will not exceed 9.5 
goals and so he accepts a £20 stake from another gambler who believes the final 
result will exceed 9.5 goals. If the final score is over 9.5, he will win £1490 from his 
first bet, lose £980 from his second bet, and so win £510 overall (minus commission). 
If the final score is under 9.5, he will lose the £10 stake in the first bet, win the £20 
stake in the second bet, and so win £10 overall (minus commission). At half time, 
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this gambler can guarantee making profit no matter what the final score is. Such 
hedging is a real skill that gamblers can learn.          
Among gamblers, it is widely believed that there is useful knowledge to be 
learned about different sports. There are books, columns and websites that provide 
tips for betting. Betting companies also sell past records to people who want to carry 
out analyses. However, researchers have not found much evidence of expertise 
(Ladouceur, Giroux and Jacques 1998; Cantinotti, Ladouceur and Jacques, 2004). 
Ladouceur, Giroux and Jacques (1998) found that experts won more times than 
randomly selected betters but did not win any more money. Experts were just being 
cautious and chose safe bets, but they still lost money overall. If this is to be called 
an expert strategy, then so should the strategy of not gambling at all as this would 
have a non-negative return of zero.  
Gamblers feel empowered by knowing the past records of sports teams and 
the latest updates. Their confidence level is increased, but their performance level is 
not (Cantinotti, Ladouceur and Jacques, 2004). Research has shown that experienced 
betters make more accurate judgments in complicated tasks, such as the final score 
of a game and the ball control time by each team in a game in football. However, 
they do not perform any better in simple tasks, such as predicting which teams went 
through to t he next round in the World Cup 2006 (Andersson, Memmert and 
Popowicz, 2009). It is not clear whether experienced betters can make profits or not. 
It is not impossible that some gamblers have inside information (Crafts, 1985). 
Superstition is common in sports gambling. Windross (2003) found that a 
majority of people betting on horseracing believed in luck and they practiced 
superstitious ceremonies to create good luck. The superstitious behaviours include 
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choosing a lucky number or lucky colour, finding a lucky letter combination in horse 
names, combining the numbers of the two previous winning horses, and so on. 
Gamblers believe luck can be observed and manipulated. Superstitious rituals are the 
methods that are used to obtain good luck. Some rituals can appear bizarre and 
dangerous. For example, in South East Asia, some people run in front of trucks on 
highways to read their number plates. The number plate gives clues of the lucky 
number. The closer the gambler runs to the truck, the luckier the number.  
When people have no control over uncertainty, they may turn to superstition 
in an attempt to feel that they are still in charge. The hot hand fallacy represents one 
such illusion of control. This is the belief that winning brings forth more winning. In 
skill-based games, people may believe that winning is a signal that a period of 
especially good performance has started and that it will continue. As a result, a streak 
of winning indicates that the streak will continue. Ayton and Fischer (2004) 
discovered that people who were told that a run of the same outcome was the result 
of random process predicted the trend would reverse whereas those who were told 
that the same sequence was the result of an algorithm predicted that it would 
continue. Fischer and Savranevski (2015) obtained a similar result.  
This begs an obvious question: do gamblers believe that sports-betting is 
skill-based or not? If they believe that it is their skills that give them an edge, they 
should predict they are more likely to win after winning and therefore become more 
risk seeking. Xu and Harvey (2014) discovered the opposite: in sports gambling, 
gamblers predicted the trend in their betting performance would reverse. They were 
more risk averse after winning and more risk seeking after losing. They chose safer 
odds after winning and riskier odds after losing. Interestingly, this actually produced 
a hot hand effect because safer odds are more likely to produce a win and risky odds 
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are more likely to produce a loss. However, safer odds do not have high payoffs. 
Hence, gamblers who have experienced a winning streak may feel that their 
gambling performance has improved even though they have not actually made more 
profits. This echoes the observation by Ladouceur, Paquet and Dubé (1996) that 
experts did not make more money in spite of higher probability of winning. They 
might become experts simply by winning more times rather than winning more 
money. They can be expert and problem gamblers at the same time. However, good 
moods resulting from previous wins may lead to risk aversion in future bets (Isen & 
Patrick, 1984). When people are in a good mood, they may choose safer bets to 
maintain that mood by avoiding losses. This is an alternative explanation to Xu and 
Harvey (2014). This could also create hot hand phenomenon even if the estimate of 
the risk level of the future bets remains unchanged.  
2.6 Card games 
Wardle et al (2011) reports that, in 2010, 2% of adults in the UK played 
poker in a pub or club, 5% went to a casino to gamble on games (including poker 
and blackjack), and 13% played online games (including poker and blackjack). 
There are many different kinds of card games. Some of them, such as blackjack and 
poker, have both elements of luck and of real expertise. In blackjack, which is also 
called twenty-one, the players take cards in rounds and the one who wins is the 
person who reaches 21 points or who is the closest to 21 without exceeding that 
number of points. It is played between the dealer of the house and one or more 
gamblers. If players can remember the cards that have already appeared in the game, 
they will have a better chance of guessing other people's cards and the cards that are 
going to appear.  
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 In lottery and roulette, anomalies are rare and when they happen, it is 
difficult to profit from them; in card games, there are real cases of sustainable 
successes. One of the legends is the MIT blackjack team (Mezrich, 2002). They used 
a card counting technique. Cards A, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, are marked as +1, cards 7, 8, 9 are 
marked as 0, cards 10, J, Q, K are marked -1. The gambler keeps adding the value of 
the cards as they appear. If the sum is negative, it means there are more small cards 
in the undistributed deck. This is advantageous to the house and so gamblers should 
decrease their stake. Though the profit level of the MIT blackjack team has not been 
verified, statistically it is possible to profit from blackjack, poker and other card 
games (Javarone, 2015; DeDonno and Detterman, 2008; Turner, 2008).  
It is not easy to make money by playing card games because, after all, the 
success is largely influenced by holding good cards and gamblers may not have 
enough funds to survive potential losses. Hurley and Pavlov (2011) carried out a 
simulation based on the card counting technique. They found that, although the 
expected return was positive with the card counting technique, with a minimum 
stake of $100, the 95% confidence interval of return ranged between -$59,570 and  
$76,044. It is a risky business. The gamblers must be prepared for difficult periods 
during their search for positive returns. There are also exogenous risks that are not 
related to card games per se. For example, casinos do not welcome card counters and 
they may restrict entry for such players. If this happens when the players are losing, 
it may be difficult to play enough games to reach the expected value. It is possible 
that people become problem gamblers with the belief that they will win their money 
back.  
Poker games often involve a combination of the suit and the points of the 
cards. There are many different kinds of poker games. The rank of the card 
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combinations from low to high normally are: single, pair, three of a kind, straight 
(consecutive cards), flush (cards of the same suit), full house (three card of one rank 
and two cards of another rank), four of a kind, straight flush (consecutive cards of 
the same suit). There are small variations in ranking orders in different games. Texas 
Hold’em is a popular variant of poker. It has three to five community cards visible to 
all players. Players can use the community cards with their own secret two cards to 
form combinations. They can decide to increase the stake or to fold as the games 
goes along.  Players win either by having the highest rank of the combination or by 
being the only person remaining.  
In Texas Hold'em, players guess each other's cards by observing their stake 
change and other emotional signals. Cards games are available online or in a casino. 
There is evidence of real expertise in this game (Hannum and Cabot, 2009; Fiedler 
and Rock, 2009). Experts consistently perform better than amateurs. Experts are 
better at minimizing loss when they have bad cards (Meyer,von Meduna, Brosowski 
and Hayer, 2013). It is also possible to teach neural networks to play Texas Hold 'em 
to a professional level based on evolutionary methods (Nicolai and Hilderman, 2009). 
The argument that it is a skill-based game may give it a status of sport rather than 
gambling. As a sport, it would receive less strict regulation.  
2.7 Summary 
Gambling is a mixture of biases, fallacies, and real expertise. It provides 
terrific opportunities to study monetary decision making. In this chapter, I have 
described a variety of phenomena associated with the psychology of gambling and 
have shown how they may be explained in different gambling contexts.  
33 
 
People tend to overestimate low odds of winning (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1992).  This overestimation may arise from use of the availability heuristic, from 
illusions of control, or from over-inflated confidence associated with acquisition of 
knowledge specific to the gambling domain. Gamblers also have techniques that they 
believe enhance their chances of winning: these include superstitious practices and 
choosing random looking lottery numbers. Some of these techniques are effective: 
real skills in some card games and in use of hedging strategies can bring profit. 
However, the vast majority of the gamblers are likely to lose money in the long term. 
Once it has been lost, many of them become susceptible to loss chasing. They 
believe their luck is going to turn and they must bet again to win the money back. As 
long as they continue to gamble, the book is still open and losses are not yet realized. 
They have to keep gambling to prevent that happening. As a result, they often end up 
losing more money. The brain may fail to discriminate adequately between wins and 
losses: there is evidence that indicates that near misses activate the same brain region 
as wins. Confusion arising from this could also encourage continuation of gambling. 










Chapter 3. Problem gambling 
Problem gambling (gambling addiction, pathological gambling) is a mental 
disorder defined by DSM-5 as "persistent and recurrent problematic gambling 
behaviour leading to clinically significant impairment or distress'' (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2014). Two of the major screening questionnaires for 
problem gambling are the South Oaks Gambling Screen (Lesieur and Blume, 1987) 
and the Problem Gambling Severity Index (Stinchfield, Govoni and Frisch, 2007).  
According to the British Gambling Prevalence Survey in 2010, 1.5% of men, 
0.3% of women and 0.9% of the entire adult population are problem gamblers 
(Wardle et al, 2011). Problem gambling is a major psychological disorder in the 
same league as depression or panic disorder (McManus, Meltzer, Brugha, 
Bebbington and Jenkins, 2009). It is positively correlated with being male, young, 
having a low level of education, and having a low socio-economic status (Wardle et 
al, 2011). Internet gambling, because of its constant availability and convenience, 
may exacerbate problem gambling: Researchers found that half of problem gamblers 
reported that convenient online payment increased their monetary losses (Gainsbury, 
Russell, Hing, Wood, Lubman and Blaszczynski, 2015). The internet gamblers also 
gamble in more games because they are offered a wider choice than that offered by 
traditional casino or gambling shops.  
Blaszczynski and Nower (2002) suggested that there are three kinds of 
problem gamblers: gamblers with poor judgment and decision-making skills; those 
who gamble in order to satisfy emotional needs; gamblers with neurological or 
neurochemical dysfunctions.  
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The first of these do not have any psychopathology before they start 
gambling. They embark upon their gambling habit because it represents an easily 
accessible or social activity. They may experience excitement from their gambling, 
they may experience illusions of control or other kinds of irrational belief, and, for 
the reasons we have discussed, they may believe that they can win. After losing, they 
may start to chase their losses and, as a result, they may lose even more. Evidence 
suggests that this type of gambler can gain control over their habit with minimal 
intervention provided by sound economic reasoning (Hodgins, 2005).  
The second type of problem gambler often has a family history of problem 
gambling, together with emotional and biological vulnerabilities (e.g., depression, 
anxiety). Gambling provides an escape from these problems (Jacobs, 1988; Lesieur 
and Rothschild, 1989; Gambino, Fitzgerald, Shaffer, Renner and Courtage, 1993).  
The third type of problem gambler typically exhibits impulsive or antisocial 
behaviours that are independent of their gambling. Such behaviours include 
substance abuse, suicidality, irritability, low tolerance for boredom, and criminal 
behaviour not related to gambling. In other words, they have problem behaviours 
that are manifested not only in gambling but also in other ways (Goldstein, 
Manowitz, Nora, Swartzburg and Carlton,1985; Carlton, Manowitz, McBride, Nora, 
Swartzburg and Goldstein, 1987).  
We have pointed out that most forms of gambling in most situations have 
negative expected returns. Why would people be addicted to negative returns? 
Neurological research has cast some light on this. When they are viewing gambling 
scenarios, problem gamblers show decreased brain activity in regions that control 
impulse, emotion, and decision-making (Potenza, 2014; Potenza, Steinberg, 
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Skudlarski, Fulbright, Lacadie, Wiber, Rounsaville, Gore and Wexler, 2003). When 
viewing these scenarios, they also have decreased activity in brain regions 
responding to loss and increased activity in those regions associated with pleasure 
and risk taking (van Holst, van Den Brink, Veltman and Goudriaan, 2010). It is still 
unclear whether the brain regions associated with problem gambling overlap with 
those related to substance abuse (Potenza et al, 2003; Grant, Brewer and Potenza, 
2006). However, some medical treatments used for substance abuse are used to treat 
problem gambling and have been found to be effective (Bullock and Potenza, 2013). 
There is also some evidence that problem gambling is associated with abnormal 
levels of various neurotransmitters, such as serotonin, dopamine, endogenous 
opioids and hormones (Grant, Brewer and Potenza, 2006). It is not yet clear whether 
these anomalies in neurological function are inherited (Lin, Lyons, Scherrer, Griffith, 
True, Goldberg and Tsuang, 1998).  
For less severe problem gamblers, brief interventions like warning messages 
have been used to reduce the gambling behaviour. This approach appears to be 
useful for some of them (Hodgins, 2005) but not for others (Steenbergh, Whelan, 
Meyers, May and Floyd, 2004). Courses of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) 
typically last longer than brief interventions: in Gooding and Tarrier's (2009) study, 
the minimum effective CBT session length was four hours. There are different 
variants of CBT. These range from correction of perceptions about gambling, 
desensitization to images of gambling, and reduction in motivations to gamble. Some 
studies have shown that CBT is effective in reducing gambling behaviours (Sylvain, 
Ladouceur and Boisvert, 1997; Gooding and Tarrier, 2009). Psychopharmacological 
treatments have also been used, with or without behavioural therapies, to reduce 
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problem gambling and some of these have been found to be effective (Leung and 
Cottler, 2009; Bullock and Potenza, 2013).  
Research has found that risk preference is related to the level of certain 
hormones, particularly testosterone. Men and women who have high testosterone 
levels are more risk seeking than their low testosterone level counterparts (Stanton, 
Liening and Schultheiss, 2011).  Men naturally have higher testosterone levels than 
women and they are more risk seeking. Adolescent males and females in different 
stage of puberty have different levels of testosterone and their testosterone levels are 
positively related to their risk seeking behaviours (Op de Macks, Gunther Moor, 
Overgaauw, Güroğlu, Dahl and Crone, 2011).  Injecting women with testosterone 
results in reduced sensitivity to loss and increased risk seeking (Van Honk, Schutter, 
Hermans, Putman, Tuiten and Koppeschaar, 2004; Eisenegger and Naef, 2011). 
Furthermore, a low ratio of the length of the index finger to the ring finger, an 
indicator of pre-birth testosterone levels inside mother's uterus, is associated with 
high levels of risk seeking (Neave, Laing, Fink and Manning, 2003; Stenstrom, Saad, 
Nepomuceno and Mendenhall, 2011). All these findings imply that risk preference 
has a biological basis and can be influenced by long-term and short-term testosterone 
levels.  
In summary, people may become problem gamblers because they 
overestimate their chances of winning, because they suffer emotional vulnerabilities 
that are temporarily offset by gambling, or because they have neurological 
abnormalities manifested in various antisocial behaviours that include gambling. 
Problem gamblers may have abnormal brain activity or neurotransmitter levels. High 
testosterone level predicts high risk preference.  
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In the chapter 6, I will discuss the difference between those who can and 
cannot make money from gambling. It seems that limiting loss chasing is the key to 
losing less money or even to winning more. Problem gamblers lacks the ability to 
















Chapter 4. The gamblers' fallacy creates the hot-hand effect 
To date, there is little research on real gambling. The research reported in this 
chapter demonstrates the existence of the hot hand effect in gambling, investigates 
gamblers’ beliefs in the hot hand effect and the gamblers’ fallacy, and finally 
explores the causal relationship between the hot hand effect and the gamblers’ 
fallacy.  
4.1 Data set 
A large real online gambling database was used. In this analysis, streaks of 
winning and streaks of losing were used to detect the relationship between the hot 
hand effect and the gamblers' fallacy.  
The complete gambling history of 776 gamblers between 1 Jan 2010 and 31 
Dec 2010 was obtained from an online gambling company. The gamblers were 
selected randomly from the customer database. In total, 565,915 sports exchange 
bets were placed by these gamblers during the year. In sports exchange, gamblers put 
or take odds against each other. Characteristics of the samples are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Sample characteristics for sports bets placed in each of three currencies for 
the year 2010. 
 
GBP EUR USD 
Number of bets 371,306 162,077 32,532 
Number of gamblers 407 318 51 







Median stake £14 €18 $15 
Maximum stake £313,900 €1,492,000 $20,500 
Mean number of bets placed by a single 
account  
917 517 641 
Median number of bets placed by a single 
account 
171 88 153 
Number of horse racing bets 260,550 34,659 8,290 
Number of football bets 69,863 90,415 12,058 
Number of greyhound racing bets 28,859 6,660 9,159 
 
 
Each gambling record included the following information: game type (e.g., 
horse racing, football, and cricket), game name (e.g. Huddersfield v West 
Bromwich), time, stake, type of bet, odds, result, and payoff. Each person was 
identified by a unique account number. All the bets they placed in the year were 
arranged in chronological order by the time of settlement, which was precise to the 
minute. The time when the stake was placed was not available. According to the 
gambling house, there is no reason to think that the stake was placed long before the 
time of the settlement.  Each account used one currency, which was chosen when the 




4.2 Methodology and results 
If there is a hot hand effect, then, after a winning bet, the probability of 
winning the next bet should go up. I compared the probability of winning after 
different run lengths of previous wins with the probability of winning not following 




Figure 1. Probability of winning after obtaining winning streaks of different lengths 





First, we counted all the bets in GBP; there were 178,947 bets won and 
192,359 bets lost. The probability of winning was 0.48. 
Second, we took all the 178,947winning bets and counted the number of bets 
that won again; there were 88,036 bets won. The probability of winning was 0.49. In 
comparison, following the 192,359 lost bets, the probability of winning was 0.47. 
The probability of winning in these two situations was significantly different (Z = 
12.10, p < .0001). 
Third, we took all the 88,036 bets, which already had won twice and 
examined the results of bets that followed these bets. There were 50,300 bets won. 
The probability of winning rose to 0.57. In contrast, the probability of winning did 
not rise after gambles that did not show a winning streak: it was 0.45. The 
probability of winning in these two situations was significantly different (Z = 60.74, 
p < .0001). 
Fourth, we examined the 50,300 bets which already won three times and 
checked the result of the bets followed them. I found that 33,871 bets won. The 
probability of winning went up again to 0.67. In contrast, the bets not having a run of 
lucky predecessors showed a probability of winning of 0.45. The probability of 
winning in these two situations was significantly different (Z = 90.63, p < .0001). 
Fifth, we used the same procedure and again took all the 33,871 bets which 
already won four times. We checked the result of bets followed these bets. There 
were 24,390 bets won. The probability of winning went up again to 0.72. In contrast, 
the bets without a run of previous wins showed a probability of winning of only 
0.45. The probability of winning in these two situations was significantly different 
(Z = 91.96, p < .0001). 
Sixth, we used the same method to check the 24,390 bets which already won 
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five times in a row. There were 18,190 bets won, giving a probability of winning of 
0.75. After other bets, the probability of winning was 0.46. The probability of 
winning in these two cases was significantly different (Z = 86.78, p < .0001). 
Seventh, we examined the 18,190 bets that had won six times in a row. 
Following such a lucky streak, the probability of winning was 0.76. However, for the 
bets that had not won on the immediately preceding occasion, the probability of 
winning was only 0.47. These two probabilities of winning were significantly 
different. (Z = 77.50, p < .0001). 
The results showed that gamblers were more likely to win after winning 
streaks, i.e. hot hand effects exist. The hot hand also occurred for bets in other 
currencies (Figure 1). Regressions (Table 2) show that, after each successive 
winning bet, the probability of winning increased by 0.05 (t(5) = 8.90, p < .001) for 
GBP, by 0.06 for EUR (t(5) = 8.00, p < .001), and by 0.05 for USD (t(5) = 8.90, p < 
.001).  
We used the same approach to analyze the gamblers’ fallacy. If the gamblers’ 
fallacy is not a fallacy, the probability of winning should go up after losing several 
bets. I also compared the probability of winning in this situation to to the probability 
of winning not following a losing streak. 
The first step was same as in the analysis of the hot hand.  We counted all the 
bets in GBP; there were 178,947 bets won and 192,359 bets lost. The probability of 




Figure 2. Probability of winning after obtaining losing streaks of different lengths (o) 
and after not obtaining losing streaks of those lengths (Δ). 
 
In the second step, we identified the 192,359 bets that lost and examined 
results of the bets immediately after them. Of these, 90,764 won and 101,595 lost. 
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The probability of winning was 0.47. After the 178,947 bets that won, the probability 
of winning was 0.49. The difference between these two probabilities were significant 
(Z = 12.01, p < 0.001).  
In the third step, we took the 101,595 bets that lost and examined the bets 
following them. We found that 40,856 bets won and 60,739 bets lost. The probability 
of winning after having lost twice was 0.40. In contrast, for the bets that did not lose 
on both of the previous rounds, the probability of winning was 0.51. The difference 
between these probabilities was significant (Z = 58.63, p < 0.001). 
 In the fourth step, we repeated the same procedure. After the 60,739 bets that 
had lost three times in a row, there were 19,142 winning bets won and losing 41,595 
bets ones, giving a probability of winning of 0.32. For other bets, this probability 
was 0.51 (Z = 88.26, p < 0.001). 
The fifth, sixth and seventh steps were carried out in an analogous way. They 
showed that the probability of winning after four lost bets was 0.27, after five lost 
bets was 0.25, and after six lost bets was 0.23.  
The pattern was similar for bets in other currencies (Figure 2). Regressions 
(Table 2) showed that each successive losing bet decreased the probability of 
winning 0.05 (t(5) = 9.71, p < .001) for GBP, by 0.05 for EUR (t(5) = 9.10, p < .001) 
and by 0.02  for USD (t(5) = 7.56, p < .001). This is bad news for those who believe 
in the gamblers’ fallacy.  
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Table 3. Regressions for length of streaks predicting the probability of winning. 
 
  
B SE B β t Sig.(p) F 𝑅2 
GBP 
 Win 0.475 0.021 0.053*(0.006) 8.902 <0.001 79.25 0.928 
Lose 0.489 0.018 -0.047*(0.004) 9.711 <0.001 94.31 0.940 
EUR 
 Win 0.439 0.026 0.059*(0.007) 8.223 <0.001 67.62 0.917 
Lose 0.508 0.021 -0.053*(0.006) 9.100 <0.001 82.8 0.932 
USD 
 Win 0.315 0.025 0.054*(0.007) 7.996 <0.001 63.93 0.913 
Lose 0.386 0.010 -0.022*(0.003) 7.560 <0.001 57.15 0.904 
Note: The independent variable is the number of bets taken into consideration. 
 
4.3 Do gamblers with long winning streaks have higher payoffs? No. 
One potential explanation for the appearance of the hot hand is that gamblers 
with long winning streaks consistently do better than others. To examine this 
possibility, we compared the mean payoff of these gamblers with the mean payoff of 
the remaining gamblers. 
Among 407 gamblers using GBP, 144 of them had at least six successive 
wins in a row on at least one occasion. They had a mean loss of £1.0078 (N = 
279,162, SD = 0.47) for every £1 stake they placed. The remaining 263 gamblers 
had a mean loss of £1.0077 (N = 92,144, SD = 0.38) for every £1 stake they placed. 
The difference between these two was not significant. 
We performed same analysis for bets made in EUR. Among 318 gamblers 
using this currency, 111 of them had at least one winning streak of six. They had a 
mean loss of €1.005 (N = 105,136, SD = 0.07) for every €1 of stake. The remaining 
207 EUR gamblers had a mean loss of €1.002 (N = 56,941, SD = 0.22). The 
difference between these two returns was significant (t (162,075) = 4.735, p < 
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0.0001). Those who had long winning streaks actually lost more than others. They 
did not win more. 
The results in USD also failed to show that those with long winning streaks 
won more.  Seventeen gamblers had at least one winning streak of six and 34 did 
not. For those who had, the mean loss was $1.022(N = 23,280, SD = 0.75); for those 
who had not, it was $1.029 (n = 9,252, SD = 0.35). There was no significant 
difference between the two ( t(32530) = 0.861, p = 0.389). The gamblers who had 
long winning streaks were not better at winning money than gamblers who did not 
have them. 
4.4 The effects of winning and losing streaks on level of odds selected. 
To determine whether the gamblers believed in the hot hand or gamblers’ 
fallacy, we examined how the results of their gambling affected the odds of their 
next bet. Among all GBP gamblers, the mean level of selected odds was 7.72 and the  
median odds was 1.11 (N = 371,306, SD = 37.73). After a winning bet, lower odds 
were chosen for the next bet. The mean odds dropped to 6.19 and the median odds to 
0.61, (N = 178,947, SD = 35.02). Following two consecutive winning bets, the mean 
odds decreased to 3.60 and the median odds to 0.32 (N = 88,036, SD = 24.69). 
People who had won on more consecutive occasions a person selected less risky 














After a losing bet, the opposite was found. People who had lost on more 
consecutive occasions selected riskier odds. After six lost bets in a row, the mean 
odds went up to 17.07 and the median odds to 6.00 (N = 22,694, SD = 50.62). In 
comparison, after winning six times in a row, the figure for mean odds was 0.85, and 
the median odds was 0.15 (N = 18,252, SD = 9.82). From the odds that they selected, 
we can infer that gamblers followed the gamblers’ fallacy but were unaffected by the 
hot hand. 
  
The gambling results were affected by the gamblers’ choice of odds. One 
point increase in the odds reduced the probability of winning by 0.035 (SD = 0.003, t 
(36) = 13.403, p < .001). 
4.5 The effects of winning and losing streaks on stake size 
Among all GBP gamblers, the median stake was £14 (N = 371,306, 
Interquartile Rang = 4.80 - 53.29). After winning once, the median stake went up to 
£18.47 (N = 178,947, Interquartile Range = 5.04 - 66.00). After winning twice in a 
row, the median stake rose to £20.45 (N = 88,036, Interquartile Range = 8.00 - 




Figure 4. Median stake size after winning (o) and losing (Δ) streaks of different 
lengths. 
 
For gamblers who lost, the opposite was found. People who had lost on more 
consecutive occasions decreased their stakes more. After losing once, the median 
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stake went down to £10.89 (N = 192,359, Interquartile Range = 4.00 - 44.16). After 
losing twice in a row, the median stake dropped to £10.00 (N = 101,595, 
Interquartile Range = 3.33 - 30.00). These trends continued (Figure 4, top panel). 
Gamblers increased stake size after winning and decreased stake size after losing. 
This could be the effect of more money being available after winning and less money 
being available after losing.  
We examined EUR and USD bets. Findings for selected odds were similar 
(Figure 3a and 3b) but those for stake size were less robust (Figure 4), perhaps 
because of the reduced sample size. 
4.5  Hot hands exist because people follow the gamblers’ fallacy 
We found evidence for the hot hand but not for the gamblers’ fallacy. 
Gamblers were more likely to win after winning and to lose after losing. 
After winning, gamblers selected safer odds. After losing, they selected 
riskier odds. After winning or losing, they expected the trend to reverse: they 
believed the gamblers’ fallacy. By believing in the gamblers’ fallacy, people created 
their own luck. The result is ironic: Winners worried their good luck was not going 
to continue, so they selected safer odds. By doing so, they became more likely to win. 
The losers expected the luck to turn, so they took riskier odds. However, this made 
them even more likely to lose. The gamblers’ fallacy created the hot hand. 
Ayton and Fischer (2004) found that people believed in the gamblers’ fallacy 
for random events over which they had no control. Our gamblers displayed the 
gamblers’ fallacy for actions (i.e. bets) that they took themselves. This may indicate 
that they did not believe that bets were under their control. Fong, Law, and Lam 
(2013) reported Chinese gamblers believed their luck would continue. Does this 
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mean they felt they had more control over their bets? By believing their luck would 
continue, did they help to bring it to an end? 
These results have implications for other domains (e.g., financial trading) 
where people reduce their preference for risk in the wake of chance success and 
thereby give the impression of a hot hand. Furthermore, they may attribute their 
successes to skill rather than chance (Langer, 1975) and may not be aware of their 
change in risk preference. In such circumstances, they may develop the illusion that 
they are becoming better at the task and able to persuade others that this is so. In the 
financial domain, this would have clear implications for people’s selection of 
investment strategies. 
It is also possible that a good mood resulting from the previous wins may 
lead to risk aversion in future bets (Isen & Patrick, 1984). When people are in a good 
mood, they may choose safer bets to maintain their mood. This could create hot hand 
phenomenon too. 
4.6 Gamblers became safer or riskier after winning or losing streaks, not the 
other way round. 
After publication of the findings described above, Demaree, Weaver, and 
Juergensen (2014) published a criticism. They pointed out the results could have 
arisen from a selection effect. In other words, the method that we used to count the 
streaks could have selected out gamblers who were placing safer or riskier odds all 
along. Thus, Demaree et al (2014) claimed that "participants on winning or losing 
streaks may have already been choosing safer and riskier wagers, respectively, prior 
to the beginning of their streaks." They used the information available in the original 
paper (Xu and Harvey, 2014) to show that the probability of winning in groups 
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which had won consecutively was significantly higher than the probability of 
winning in the entire population. Conversely, the probability of winning in groups 
which had lost consecutively was significantly lower than the probability of winning 
in the entire population. They argued that these results indicated the presence of a 
selection effect. In this section, I demonstrate why they were wrong and why we 
were right. 
Methodology 
If the selection effect exists, gamblers with longer winning streaks should 
have selected bets with lower odds than those with shorter winning streaks. They 
should have selected safe bets all along rather than only after winning streaks. 
Hence, gamblers with longer winning streaks should have selected lower mean odds 
on all the bets they placed, not just on the bets that they placed after their winning 
streaks.    
First, we identified all the gamblers who had won six times consecutively at 
least once. Second, we identified all the bets placed by those gamblers. By using all 
the bets in our analysis, we was able to measure the overall risk propensity of the 
gamblers rather than just their risk propensity when they were winning. After that, 
we repeated these two steps for gamblers who had won a maximum of five times at 
least once. In the same way, we identified all the bets made by gamblers who had 
won a maximum of four times, three times, twice and just once. As a result of this 
procedure, we was able to organize the bets according to the maximum length of the 
winning streaks of the gamblers who made them. 
We carried out the same procedure on losing bets.  If a selection effect was in 
operation, gamblers with longer losing streaks should have higher odds than those 
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with shorter losing streaks. They should have selected risky bets all along rather than 
only after losing streaks. Hence, an analysis should show that they selected higher 
mean odds on all the bets they placed, not just the bets that they placed after their 
losing streaks.    
In addition, we carried out a within-participants analysis to examine the 
relation between the lengths of streaks experienced and the odds then chosen. Our 
original interpretation predicts that the length of streaks should have significant 
effect on the odds chosen within the same person.  
Results 
Gamblers with longer winning streaks did not have lower odds than those 
with shorter winning streaks over all (F (1, 6) = 1.83; p = 0.26), (Figure 5). Gamblers 
with longer losing streaks did not have higher odds than those with shorter losing 
streaks over all (F (1, 6) = 2.16; p = 0.19). Gamblers were not taking safer or riskier 
bets before the winning or losing streaks. This implies that gamblers bet more safely 
only after winning streaks and bet more riskily only after losing ones. Thus, the 





Figure 5. Mean odds plotted against streak length. The continuous line with the “o” 
symbol shows data for consecutive wins and the dotted line with the “▢” symbol 
shows data for consecutive losses. 
 
One-way between-groups analyses of variance were carried out to determine 
whether the odds that gamblers selected depended on the longest winning or losing 
streak that they had experienced. Separate analyses were performed for winning and 
losing streaks in EUR and USD (Figure 5). None of these six analyses showed a 



























Replication of the original effect within each gambler 
We then performed analyses to replicate the original effect within each 
gambler. Thus, our question was whether individual gamblers tend to select safer 
odds after experiencing longer winning streaks and riskier odds after experiencing 
longer losing streaks. We used repeated measures analyses of variance to examine 
the effect of the length of the winning streak experienced by a gambler on the odds 
selected by that gambler. These showed the expected effects for GBP (F (1, 396,845) 
= 4.73; p = 0.03), EUR (F (1, 161,791) = 17.21; p < 0 .001), and USD (F (1, 32,483) 
= 4.48; p = 0.04). A similar repeated measures analysis for losing streaks showed the 
expected effects for GBP (F (1, 365,226) = 21.65; p < 0.001) and EUR (F (1, 
161,788) = 9.17; p = 0.003) but not for USD (F (1, 32,480) = 0.45; p=0.50 NS). As 
in my original analysis, I attribute the failure to obtain a significant losing streak 
effect for USD to the relatively small sample size.  
Conclusions 
There was no sign that gamblers who experienced longer winning streaks 
generally placed safer bets or that gamblers who suffered longer losing streaks 
generally placed riskier bets. In other words, there was no evidence of a selection 
effect. Furthermore, we have shown that, within individual gamblers, increasingly 
safe odds are chosen as winning streaks increase in length and increasingly risky 
odds are chosen as losing streaks increase in length. This reinforces my original 
conclusion and is not consistent with a selection effect. In summary, gamblers 
became safer only after they had experienced winning streaks and became riskier 
after they had experienced losing streaks. People who won were more likely to win 
again because they chose safer odds than before and those who lost were more likely 
to lose again because they chose riskier odds than before. However, selection of 
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safer odds after winning and riskier ones after losing indicates that online sports 
gamblers expected their luck to reverse: they suffered from the gamblers’ fallacy. By 

















Chapter 5. A roulette experiment 
In the chapter 4, sports gamblers showed a tendency of choosing lower odds 
after longer winning streaks and higher odds after longer losing streaks. They 
appeared to believe in gamblers' fallacy. By choosing lower odds, the winners won 
more often and created a hot-hand effect. By choosing riskier odds after losing, the 
losers lost more often. They created their own luck. If this self-fulfilling prophecy is 
disrupted, what will happen? If choosing a safe bet no longer brings a safe result, 
will people continue betting in a safe way? If a risky bet does not bring punishment, 
what will happen? In this chapter, I will use a roulette experiment to answer these 
questions.  
Roulette requires no skill. It is a game of pure chance. The odds are 
completely clear and transparent. The expected return of one unit of stake is -1/37 
for European roulette and -2/38 for American roulette. Because of the 
straightforward format of the gambling, roulette is a good game for discussion of the 
hot hand and the gamblers' fallacies. In this roulette experiment, I aim to test whether 
people’s gambling becomes more or less risky after winning or losing streaks. 
Unknown to the gamblers, they experienced good or bad pre-determined ‘luck’. 
They were chosen by the programme either to a long streak of winning or doomed to 
lose for many times in a row. 
5.1 Methodology 
Participants  
Participants were recruited online from Amazon Mechanical Turk. They 
followed a link to a webpage with a roulette wheel. In total, 4712 people took part in 
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the experiment. Among them, 838 people used British pounds, 50 used Euros and 
3824 used US dollars.  
Design 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups: a ‘good luck’ 
group and a ‘bad luck’ group. They did not know there were such groups and they 
did not know which group they were in. 
Stimulus materials 
Depending on the currency they chose, participants were presented with an 
American or a European roulette wheel. Gamblers who used British pounds or Euros 
were presented with European roulette and US dollar users were presented with an 
American wheel. The American roulette wheel had 38 slots and the European one 
had 37 slots. British, European and American participants were offered a notional 
sum of  £1000, €1000, or $1000, respectively, to gamble with.  
Procedure 
The first four rounds for each person were random. This gave them a chance 
to become familiar with the roulette game and hopefully prevented them from being 
suspicious of the predetermined rounds afterwards. From the fifth round to the 13th 
round, the gamblers in the ‘good luck’ group won nine times in a row no matter what 
they bet on and those in the ‘bad luck’ group lost nine times in a row. Participants 
were not made aware of the characteristics of the group to which they had been 
assigned. They were told to try to make as much money as possible. The final reward 
by lottery was positively related to how well they performed in the roulette game: 
There was one winner chosen by a random lottery among all participants. The lottery 
reward for the winner was £100*(percentile +1%). If the person who won the lottery 
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achieved a performance in the game that was better than 99% of the all the 
participants, they received the full £100. If a person who won the lottery achieved a 
performance in the game that was better than 50% of all the participants, they 
received £51. Even if the participant did not win the lottery, they did not suffer real 
losses. They only lost the fictional money which they were given at the beginning of 
the game. 
5.2 Results 
The results show that people chose high odds in the first couple of trials but 
that, very quickly, their odds dropped and then remained stable for the period in 
which they experienced either winning streaks or losing streaks (Figure 6). Whether 
participants experienced winning streaks or losing streaks did not change the odds 










Table 4. Regression for length of streaks predicting the median odds. 
 
 
    B SE df t Sig.(p) F  𝑅2 
USD 
  Always 
win 
-0.06 0.01 18 -4.83 0.001* 23.28 0.54 
  Always 
lose 
-0.06 0.01 18 -6.25 0.001* 39 0.67 
GBP 
  Always 
win 
-0.00 0.02 18 -0.18 0.86 0.04 -0.05 
  Always 
lose 
-0.00 0.01 18 0.00 1 0.00 -0.05 
EUR 
  Always 
win 
-0.06 0.02 18 --3.84 0.001* 14.75 0.42 
  Always 
lose 
-0.08 0.02 18 -3.78 0.001* 14.23 0.41 
Note: Independent variable is the length of streaks. 
 
However, when gamblers experienced winning streaks, they increased the 
stake size and when they experienced losing streaks, they decreased stake size. This 
effect could have been the result of an increase or a decrease in their wealth (Figure 




Figure 7. Median stake change in always win (o) and always lose (Δ) rounds. 
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For USD and GBP players, though the effect of winning and losing streaks 
on stake was significant, the effect sizes (𝑅2) were small. For Euro players, it was 
not significant. This may have been due to the relatively small number of the Euro 
players. It is difficult to claim how much influence the winning and losing streaks 
had on the stakes. Particularly on the losing side, it seems the stake dropped to a low 
level quickly and stayed there. It is possible that the stake had dropped to the lowest 
possible. So the stake could not drop further as long as the participants were playing.    
Table 5. Regression for length of streaks predicting the stake. 
  
β SE df t Sig.(p) F 𝑅2 
USD 
  Always win  13.64  0.92  7202  14.85  <.0001***  220.6  0.03 
  Always lose  -8.07  0.56  6637 14.41  <.0001***  208  0.03 
GBP 
  Always win 12.4  2.22 1148  5.59  <.0001***  31  0.03 
  Always lose  -3.76  1.21  1231  -3.11  0.002**  9.67  0.01 
EUR 
  Always win  9.15  8.62  104  1.06  0.29  1.13  0.01 
  Always lose  -7.28  7.27  75  -1.08  0.29  1.16  0.02 
Note: Independent variable is the length of streaks. 
 
The gamblers did not seem to change the odds or the stakes they bet on after 
losing or winning. However, they changed which numbers they bet on (Table 6). 
Binary regression was used to test whether winning or losing made gamblers change 
the slots they bet on. For USD and Euro players, winning increased the chance that 
they would change the slot that they bet on in the next round. However, for GBP 





Table 6. Binary regression of winning and losing amounts predicting change of 
chosen slot. 
 
β SE df z Sig.(p) 
USD  0.18  0.01  48338  18.95  <0.0001*** 
GBP  -0.08  0.02  9101  -3.33  <0.0001*** 
EUR  0.25  0.10  446  2.64  0.008** 
Note: Independent variable is the winning and losing amounts. 
 
5.4 Discussion  
In this experiment, the winning or losing streaks did not affect the odds; the 
streaks had a small effect on the stake. Gamblers using USD and Euro tended to keep 
betting on the same slot on the roulette while gamblers using GBP tend to change the 
slot when they win. Thus, there is some ambiguity about how gamblers react to the 
always win and always lose situation in this experiment. They seemed not react to 
the winning or losing results much. One possible explanation is that when playing 
roulette, gamblers tend not to change the odds or the stakes; they are rather reacting 
to other environmental stimuli, e.g. music, lights, movements, etc (Dixon, Trigg and 
Griffiths, 2007; Schüll, 2013). In roulette, like in other kinds of machine gambling, 
the presence of ‘flow’ could be important. Flow is a series of small fast simple 
actions which gets immediate feedback (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). Mechanical 
gambling like roulette is particularly prone to create a flow because of the simplicity 
of wagering a bet. The gamblers in this experiment could have been playing the 




Another implication is that the discovery found in the Chapter 4 may not 
apply to roulette or other forms of mechanical gambling, because the whole 
mechanism of the game and the motivation for playing it are different. 
The participants in this experiment may have behaved differently from real 
gamblers because they did not gamble with real money. This could be one of the 
reasons that they seemed not react to the winning or losing results.
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Chapter 6.  Real expertise in gambling 
It is believed by a lot of people that there is something you can do to be a 
winner in gambling. Some gambling games involve outcomes that are almost 
certainly random, e.g. lottery games and roulette. However, this does not stop people 
trying to strive for good luck. Superstition is a strategy for those who believe in it. In 
other kinds of games like sports gambling, the extent to which outcomes are random 
is less clear. There is strong tradition of believing in expertise in sports gambling.  
Numerous books, columns and websites provide tips for horse racing, football, and 
other sports. Betting companies also sell past records to people who want to carry 
out analyses. I mentioned in the Chapter 2 that there is evidence of real expertise in 
card games, such as blackjack (Mezrich, 2002; Javarone, 2015; DeDonno and 
Detterman, 2008; Turner, 2008) and in Texas Hold'em (Hannum and Cabot, 2009; 
Fiedler and Rock, 2009). In blackjack, gamblers can use the card counting technique 
to increase their chances of a positive expected return, though their chances of losing 
money are still high. In Texas Hold'em, professionals perform better than non-
professionals. It is assumed that they have real expertise. In this case, the nature of 
that expertise is less straightforward than in blackjack.      
Some researchers have not found much evidence of expertise in sports 
betting so far (Ladouceur, Giroux and Jacques 1998; Cantinotti, Ladouceur and 
Jacques, 2004). Some find moderate evidence of insider knowledge (Crafts, 1985).  
Some researchers have found that sports gamblers preferred long odds, which made 
the shorts odds somewhat profitable, or at least, less unprofitable (Golec and 
Tamarkin, 1998).  
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In this chapter, I will investigate the existence of expertise with the online 
football and horse racing data. I will present two analyses. The first one examines 
whether some gamblers consistently have better returns than fellow gamblers. The 
second is designed to discover how they achieve better returns.     
6.1 Is there real expertise? Yes. 
Data set  
In this analysis, the same online gambling data were used as in Chapter 4. In 
order to examine the expertise within games, only horse racing and football were 
chosen for study because these two games had the highest number of bets and 
highest number of participants. There are 303,499 horse racing bets by 483 gamblers 
and 172,336 football bets by 735 gamblers from January to December 2010.    
Methodology 
First, in each game, the data were separated into the 12 calendar months of 
2010. Second, within each month, gamblers’ monthly return rates on their stakes 
were ranked from high to low. The ranking was used to compare the performance 
across different gamblers across months. If some gamblers could consistently rank 
higher than other gamblers, it indicates real expertise. Third, in every month, those 
gamblers who made positive returns were selected and their monthly returns in rest 
of the year were examined. This was to test whether gamblers who made a profit in 
one month replicated their success in other months.  
Results 
For all the gamblers, their mean return rate or median return rate was almost 
all negative over the year as a whole (Table 7). This is not surprising. After all, it is 
well know that gambling is not a good way to make a living. The returns or profits 
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mentioned in this chapter are all expressed in terms of the return rate rather than the 
actual amount received to allow comparisons to be made between individuals or 
between different months.  
Table 7. Monthly median and mean returns in horse racing and football. 
 
Horse racing  Football 
 Median  return Mean return 
 
 Median  return Mean return 
Jan -0.074 -0.033  -0.007 0.050 
Feb -0.054 -0.095  -0.030 -0.121 
Mar -0.033 -0.036  -0.030 -0.135 
Apr -0.059 -0.104  -0.047 -0.102 
May -0.069 -0.170  -0.004 -0.007 
Jun -0.053 -0.183  -0.103 -0.223 
Jul -0.036 -0.004  -0.029 0.005 
Aug -0.065 -0.201  -0.074 -0.164 
Sep -0.032 -0.090  -0.041 -0.149 
Oct -0.055 -0.138  -0.038 -0.077 
Nov -0.115 -0.201  -0.064 -0.173 
Dec -0.060 -0.127  -0.051 -0.182 
 
In most months, except April and August, gamblers’ monthly performance 
ranking in each month was correlated with the ranking in other months (Table 8).  
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Table 8. The performance ranking in horse racing in each month was correlated with 
the rankings in the other months. 
 








3.76 < .001*** 
0.44 
Apr 
1.23 0.29  
0.20 
May 






2.82 < .001*** 
0.37 
Aug 
1.49 0.16  
0.24 
Sep 
2.70 < .001*** 
0.36 
Oct 
4.40 < .001*** 
0.48 
Nov 
3.81 < .001*** 
0.44 
Dec 
2.77 < .001*** 
0.37 
Note: Each row is a nonparametric rank regression. In each row, that month was the 
dependent variable and the other months were the independent variables.  
 
Ranking provides a better measurement of performance than the return on 
stake itself because it relates the performance of each individual to that of other 
fellow gamblers. The reduction in dispersion test is a nonparametric test can be used 
with rankings (Kloke and McKean, 2014). It provides a measure of fit for the whole 
nonparametric regression. The calculation was performed using R software using the 
Rfit function. When the ranking for January was the dependent variable, all other 
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months together explained 0.33 of the variance in ranking order of that month. If the 
performance ranking in February had been singled out to predict the January 
ranking, it may not have been significant and similarly for the rankings for March, or 
April and so on. However, all the performance ranking lists from February to 
December together predicted 0.33 of the ranking in January. In Table 8, each row is 
the performance ranking of that month correlated with performance rankings of all 
the remaining eleven months. The ranking of each month takes turns as the 
dependent variable and as an independent variable. The results show that, apart from 
April and August, performance rankings of all other months are significantly 
correlated with those of the remaining months. 
Table 8 shows that gamblers' performance levels in each month were 
correlated. However, if they were just losing money stably every month, this could 
hardly be called expertise. They may appear to perform better than peers, but one 
simple strategy can beat them - not gambling at all. It is indeed better to lose less 
than to lose more. But it is even better not to lose at all.  
The next question is: For gamblers who made positive returns in a particular 
month, how did they perform in other months? I analysed only the gamblers who 
made a profit in at least one month during the year. Because most of the gamblers 
did not make profit in any month, regressions would not be useful when most 
months’ profits were zero. As a result, greater insight into the issue of whether there 
is real expertise in gambling can be obtained by examining only the gamblers who 
made profit rather than all the gamblers. (Examining the gamblers who mostly lost 
would not offer new information – it would reveal only that people lose money when 
gambling, which would not be a new discovery.) In the analysis that I report here, 
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when a gambler made profit in one month, their returns in all other months, no 
matter whether they were profit or loss, were included in the analysis. Table 9 shows 
that, for eight months in 2010, among gamblers who made profit for at least one 
month, returns in horse racing in those months were correlated with returns in all 





Table 9. Positive returns in horse racing in one month were correlated with positive 






Residual degrees of 
freedom  F Sig.(p) Adjusted 𝑅2 
Jan 0.10 10 2.61 0.071 0.46 
Feb 0.62 11 6.66 0.002** 0.74 
Mar 0.07 11 7.29 0.001** 0.76 
Apr 0.08 10 7.00 0.002** 0.76 
May 0.05 10 62.99 <.0001*** 0.97 
Jun 0.16 18 8.39 <.0001*** 0.74 
Jul 0.11 21 1.82 0.11 0.22 
Aug 0.22 16 5.63 0.001** 0.65 
Sep 0.24 15 0.63 0.77 -0.18 
Oct 0.13 9 5.09 0.011* 0.69 
Nov 0.03 7 91.04 <.0001*** 0.98 
Dec 0.54 15 1.60 0.20 0.20 
Note: Each row is a linear regression of the monthly returns. In each row, that month 
was the dependent variable and the other months were the independent variables.  
Residual degrees of freedom refers to the number of values that are free to vary to in 
a calculation. A high number for degrees of freedom indicates a large sample size.  
 
Gamblers who made a positive return in one month were also likely to make 
a profit in other months, or make a smaller loss.  The residual standard error 
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measures the fit of the linear regression as a whole. As with the ranking test, if the 
performance ranking in January had been singled out to predict the February 
ranking, it might not have been significant and neither might the performance 
rankings of March, or April and so on. However, all the performance rankings from 
January and from March to December together could predict 0.74 of the variance of 
the ranking in February. 
The analysis of the football data shows similar results. For each month, gamblers’ 
monthly return rates on their stakes were ranked from high to low. The ranking was 
used to compare the performance of different gamblers across months. If some 
gamblers consistently rank higher than other gamblers, the analysis indicates real 
expertise. Again, each month's ranking could be predicted collectively by other 




Table 10. Performance ranking in football in each month was correlated with the 
rankings in the other months. 
 
Result of the Reduction in Dispersion Test Sig.(p) 𝑅2 
Jan 2.74 <.001*** 0.31 
Feb 1.90 0.05 0.24 
Mar 3.69 <.001*** 0.38 
Apr 0.42 <.001*** 0.41 
May 3.82 <.001*** 0.39 
Jun 4.91 <.001*** 0.47 
Jul 2.84 <.001*** 0.32 
Aug 3.48 <.001*** 0.36 
Sep 3.18 0.002** 0.34 
Oct 3.31 0.001** 0.35 
Nov 0.68 0.75 0.10 
Dec 2.01 0.04* 0.25 
Note: Each row is a nonparametric ranking regression. In each row, that month was 
the dependent variable and the other months were the independent variables.  
 
Football gamblers who made a profit rather than loss in a given month could 
also be predicted from the returns on their stakes in the other months. In Table 11, 
instead of rankings, the return rates were entered into the regressions.  
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Table 11. Positive returns in football in one month was correlated with positive or 





Residual degree of 
freedom  
F Sig.(p) Adjusted 𝑅2 
Jan 0.15 27 3.15 0.007** 0.38 
Feb 0.13 28 3.96 0.002** 0.45 
Mar 0.12 21 1.71 0.140 0.20 
Apr 0.19 29 1.39 0.228 0.10 
May 0.23 32 10.35 <.0001*** 0.70 
Jun 0.12 17 4.76 0.002** 0.60 
Jul 0.29 23 3.39 0.007** 0.44 
Aug 0.27 17 2.83 0.026* 0.42 
Sep 0.20 12 1.24 0.360 0.10 
Oct 0.11 22 12.26 <.0001*** 0.79 
Nov 0.21 24 3.06 0.011* 0.39 
Dec 0.08 23 4.33 0.001** 0.52 
Note: Each row is a linear regression of the monthly returns. In each row, that month 
was the dependent variable and the other months were the independent variables.  
 
6.2 What is real expertise? The ability to control loss.  
This analysis focussed on the difference between gamblers who made a profit 
and those who made a loss. It was done by investigating loss chasing patterns. Loss 
chasing is a major characteristic of problem gambling according to Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (DSM-5) (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2014). Problem gamblers want to win back money after losing streaks 
by betting again but this can lead to further loss. 
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Data set  
Exactly same data set was used as in section 6.1.  
Methodology 
The gambling records of each gambler over the whole year were arranged in 
time order. When a gambler kept playing, the records were included in a single 
session; if they stopped gambling for more than 24 hours, the session was considered 
to be terminated. When they started to play again after a break, a new session was 
considered to have started. Within each session, losing streaks were counted. For 
example, if a string of gambling records was WIN  WIN WIN LOSE LOSE LOSE 
LOSE LOSE LOSE, and there was no gap longer than 24 hours between any single 
game, the loss chasing values were 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. This gambler stopped 
playing when the loss chasing value was 6. In other words, he stopped playing when 
he had lost six times in a row . If a string of gambling records were WIN,  WIN, 
WIN, LOSE, LOSE, LOSE, LOSE, 25hr gap, LOSE, LOSE, the gambler played two 
sessions. The loss chasing values in the first session were 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. He 
stopped playing when he had lost four times in a row in the first session. The loss 
chasing values of the second session were 1, 2. He stopped playing when he had lost 
twice in a row in the second session. A gambler who stops playing at a loss chasing 
value of 6 is considered to have a more serious loss chasing problem than a gambler 
who stops at loss chasing value of 4 or 2. This analysis examines whether gamblers 
who made profits from gambling were involved in less loss chasing than gamblers 
who did not.  
Results 
Profitable gamblers were defined as those who made profit in one particular 
month. In the previous analysis in section 6.1, they had shown that they were more 
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likely to win in other eleven months as well. They were indeed less likely to chase 
losses (Table 12). Wilcoxon rank sum tests were used to compare the mean loss 
chasing value between profitable and unprofitable gamblers because loss chasing 

























Table 12. Profitable gamblers were less likely to chase loss. 










of a session 
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/Mean 
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of a session 
/Mean odds 





of a session 
/Mean 
stake at the 
end of a 
session 
Jan 
                          
1.52                                                             
                 
10.13/9.27                                                 
                      
79/83
1.75 7.03/6.22 110/107 
Feb 
                          
1.62                                                              
                  
7.02/6.80                                                  
                     
101/111
2.30 9.09/7.59 96/105 
Mar 
                          
1.49  
                   
9.62/9.08                                                  
                     
113/104
2.32 9.88/9.15 90/67 
Apr 
                          
1.52                           
              
7.24/8.67                                                  
                     
135/144
2.24 8.35/8.58 105/123 
May 
                          
1.82 
                  
8.32/8.61                                                  
                       
74/62
2.27 8.01/8.02 128/116 
Jun 
                          
1.44 
                  
7.62/9.93                                                  
                      
102/76
2.04 7.20/7.72 60/80 
Jul 
                          
1.67                           
               
6.79/7.36                                                  
                     
73/71
1.97 6.88/7.30 152/159 
Aug 
                          
1.57  
                   
8.01/6.79                                                  
                     
162/172
1.85 6.93/9.40 181/202 
Sep 
                          
1.59  
                  
9.15/7.95                                                
                     
66/57
1.76 7.014/7.51 177/171 
Oct 
                        
1.43                           
               
5.20/5.34                                                 
                     
69/71
2.21 8.19/8.25 89/92 
Nov 
                         
1.63  
                   
9.07/10.50                                               
                      
82/124
1.76 6.945/6.42 102/101 
Dec 
                         
0.99                           
5.72/5.15                                               
                     
148/156  
1.96 8.07/8.91 97/69 
Whole 
year 
1.57 8.40/8.10 105/93  2.01 7.68/7.81 114/116 
  
t = 0.54,  
df = 22,  
p  = 0.59 
NS 
t = -0.17,  
df = 21,  
p  = 0.87 
NS 
  
t = 0.15,  
df = 22,  
p  = 0.88 
NS 
t = -0.04,  
df = 22,  
p  = 0.97 
NS 
 
Wilcoxon rank sum test of loss chasing value at end of a session for profitable and 
unprofitable gamblers: W = 3, p < .0001*** 
 
Independent t-test of mean odds at the beginning of a session for profitable and 
unprofitable gamblers: t = 0.05, df = 19, p-value = 0.96 
Independent t-test of mean odds at the end of a session for profitable and 
unprofitable gamblers:  
t = -0.49, df = 17, p-value = 0.63 
 
Independent t-test of mean stake at the beginning of a session for profitable and 
unprofitable gamblers: t = -1.07, df = 22, p-value = 0.30 
Independent t-test of mean stake at the end of a session for profitable and 
unprofitable gamblers:  




Table 12 shows that unprofitable gamblers had a higher loss chasing value 
(W = 3, p < .0001***). This indicates that unprofitable gamblers quit gambling when 
they were deep into loss chasing while profitable gamblers quit when they had not 
successively lost so many times. An independent t-test showed that there was no 
significant difference between mean odds at the beginning of a session between 
profitable gamblers or unprofitable gamblers. There was also no significant 
difference between mean odds at the end of a session between profitable gamblers or 
unprofitable gamblers. In addition, there was no significant difference in mean stake 
at the beginning of a session between these two types of gamblers. Neither was there 
a significant difference between their stakes at the end of a session. Furthermore, 
compared across profitable gamblers and unprofitable gamblers, the mean odds and 
mean stake were not significantly different. (Because the comparisons were made 
between profitable and unprofitable gamblers, rather than the same group of people 
under different conditions, independent t-tests were used.)   
Conclusion 
The two analyses in this chapter show that some gamblers do have real 
expertise. Their performance was stable compared to other fellow gamblers and they 
made profits consistently across the whole year. In the second analysis, a potential 
mechanism underlying this consistent profitability was identified. Gamblers who 
made profits and gamblers who made losses were not different to start with. Their 
odds and stakes were not different at the beginning or at the end of the sessions. The 
main difference was that profitable gamblers did not chase losses as much as the 
unprofitable ones. Loss control is the key to making consistent profits. Profitable 
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gamblers stopped earlier than unprofitable gamblers. They showed less loss chasing. 
This is consistent with the stereotype of the loss chasing by problem gamblers.  
Previous research has shown that gamblers who hold more accurate estimates 
of the probability of winning are unlikely to chase loss (Svetieva and Walker, 2008; 
Griffiths and Whitty, 2010); they also show lower levels of cognitive biases 
(Gainsbury, Suhonen and Saastamoinen, 2014). Hence reduced levels of cognitive 
biases, more accurate estimates of winning probabilities and less loss chasing are 
correlated. A more rational person is likely to win more or lose less when gambling. 
Real expertise derives from rational thought.  
Obviously, limiting loss chasing do not guarantee winning. So why do some 
gamblers actually make money rather than merely make a smaller loss than other 
gamblers? The reason is unclear. It is possible that some gamblers have inside 
information (Crafts, 1985). Unfortunately, from the data that we have, it is not 
possible to differentiate between expertise and inside information.      
All major gambling houses have used systems in which gamblers can set 
limits on the own gambling behaviour. The findings outlined here could lead to other 
strategies to prevent problem gambling. For example, detection of loss chasing could 
enable the gambler or the gambling house to prevent it (Adami, Benini, Boschetti, 







Chapter 7 Discussion and summary 
Here I summarise the three main findings produced by the research reported 
in this thesis. 
7.1 Evidence for the hot hand but not for the gamblers’ fallacy.  
In sports gambling, people were more likely to win after winning streaks and 
more likely to lose after losing streaks. We found evidence for the hot hand. 
However, gamblers appeared to believe in the gamblers' fallacy: After winning, 
gamblers selected safer odds. After losing, they selected riskier odds. After winning 
or losing, they expected the trend to reverse. By following the gamblers’ fallacy, 
people created their own hot hand. This result is ironic: Winners were worried that 
their good luck was not going to continue and so they selected safer odds. By doing 
so, they became more likely to win. The losers expected their luck to turn and so 
they took riskier odds. However, this made them even more likely to lose. The 
gamblers’ fallacy created the hot hand.  
Previous research have shown that people follow the gamblers' fallacy in 
random events over which they have no control  (Ayton and Fischer, 20014; 
Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland and Hastie, 2009). Based on this research, the 
present results imply that sports gamblers do not appear to believe that they have 
control over the events they bet on. This is the opposite of the illusion of control. It 
could be called the illusion of no control.  
This discovery has implications for other domains, e.g., financial trading. 
Traders reduce their preference for risk in the wake of chance success and thereby 
give the impression of a hot hand. They may attribute their successes to skills rather 
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than chance and may not be aware of their change in risk preference. In such 
circumstances, they may develop the illusion that they are becoming better at the 
task and able to persuade others that this is so. In the financial domain, this would 
have clear implications for people’s selection of investment strategies. 
7.2 Gamblers behave differently in roulette and in sports gambling.   
When playing roulette, there was little evidence that gamblers changed their 
odds or their stake following winning or losing streaks. It was also unclear whether 
they changed the nature of their bets. In other words, they did not appear to react 
much to winning or losing. It is possible that roulette gamblers are enjoying things 
other than the results of their gambling. This makes it difficult to compare sports 
gambling and roulette gambling: these gamblers may be motivated by different 
things. In sports gambling, every bet is unique: a new horse, a new game, a new bet. 
The gambler always needs to make new choices. In contrast, this is not the case in 
mechanical games like roulette. Other mechanical gambling games, such as playing 
fruit machines, are likely to share more similarities with roulette than with sports 
gambling.  
7.3 There is real expertise in sports gambling: it is loss control. 
Some gamblers consistently outperformed their peers. They also consistently 
made higher profits or lower losses. This indicates either real expertise or use of 
inside information. These profitable gamblers do not differ from unprofitable ones in 
odds that they prefer or in the stakes that they place. The key difference is that the 
profitable gamblers did not chase their losses. Combined with other research, this 
finding allows us to say that people with lower levels of cognitive biases and more 
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accurate estimates of winning probabilities show less loss chasing. This can be taken 
to imply that a more rational person is more likely to win more or to lose less when 
gambling. Thus, it appears that real expertise in gambling derives from the degree of 
rationality possessed by the gambler. A rational gambler is a gambler that accepts 
and cuts losses.  
This discovery implies that a tool to detect loss chasing could provide an 
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